Are there ways in which Gettier situations are structured , say, which amount to the presence of a kind of luck which precludes the presence of knowledge even when there is a justified true belief? This list is, no doubt, incomplete, but will suffice for my purposes. To be able to know by sight that a particular phone is the 6S model, it is natural to suppose that one must be able to tell the difference between the iPhone 6S and the iPhone 7; the possibility that the phone in question is a newer model is a relevant alternative. Richard Kirkham has proposed that it is best to start with a definition of knowledge so strong that giving a counterexample to it is logically impossible.
|Date Added:||10 February 2014|
|File Size:||39.9 Mb|
|Operating Systems:||Windows NT/2000/XP/2003/2003/7/8/10 MacOS 10/X|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
This kind of approach is not at all mainstream, but it does have its defenders—see e.
Now, it should be obvious that proposal D accepts many scenarios that would not count gettied proposal B. Conversely, the fact that a proposition turns out to be untrue is proof that it was not sufficiently justified in the first place. For in that sense prolem came close to forming a false belief; and a belief which is false is definitely not knowledge. Though Jones has gotten lucky, he could have just as easily been deceived and not have known it.
Maybe instances of numerals, such as marks on paper being interpreted on particular occasions in specific minds, can have causal effects.
The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
It would not in fact be an unusual way. Whether it can be weakened without becoming subject to a counterexample should then problsm checked.
Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. Other theorists think of the analysis of knowledge as distinctively conceptual —to analyse knowledge is to limn the structure of the concept of knowledge.
This essay and much of contemporary Anglo-American epistemology is concerned with propositional knowledge, knowledge-thatonly. In fact, that is what he is doing. Although it would represent a significant departure from much analytic epistemology of the late twentieth century, it is not clear that this gettire ultimately a gettuer radical suggestion.
A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the getrier of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology.
Patrick RysiewJessica Brownand Mikkel Gerken forthcoming have argued that traditional views about the nature of knowledge are sufficient to account for the data mentioned above. What exactly is the difference? She offered what was in effect a recipe for constructing Gettier cases:.
Given how broadly they interpret the concept of a Gettier case, and given that they don't even refer to the concept of justification when specifying their different categories, it is not at all surprising that they fail to porblem any predictive or explanatory value in the notion of a Gettier case.
In recent work, especially his book Knowledge and Its LimitsTimothy Williamson has argued that the project of analyzing knowledge was a mistake. In effect, insofar as one wishes to have beliefs which are knowledge, one should only have beliefs which are supported by evidence that is not overlooking any facts or truths which — if left overlooked — function as defeaters of whatever support is being provided by that evidence for those beliefs.
If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with ivgives us the wrong result that James knows d. Some of the contributors -- Keith Lehrer, Alvin Goldman, Peter Klein, Fred Gettjer -- were among the first wave of thinkers to publish articles that directly or indirectly responded to the Gettier problem back in the s and early s.
The standard epistemological objection to it is that it fails to do justice to the reality of our lives, seemingly as knowers of many aspects of the surrounding world. Or should we continue regarding the situation as being a Gettier case, a situation in which as in the original Case I the belief b fails to be knowledge? This fulfillment is gettuer satisfying about knowledge.
I argue, however, that there are strong links between the prolbem projects and that together problsm point us toward a workable "theory of justification. Usually, when epistemologists talk simply of knowledge they are referring to propositional knowledge.
For example, Williamson accepts these claims:. On the contrary, Williamson thinks that knowledge is among the most fundamental psychological and epistemological states there are. A Gettierian counterexample arises when the justification given by the person who makes the knowledge-claim cannot be accepted by the knowledge evaluator because it does not fit with his wider informational setting.
Consequently, hypothetical thought experiments provide appropriate test cases for various analyses, as we shall see below. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. Consequently, it is quite possible that the scope of the Appropriate Causality Proposal is more getier than is epistemologically desirable. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. And what degree of precision should it have?